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ABSTRACT-
In 1992, Maxine Hairston's "Diversity, Ideology, and 
Teaching Writing" claimed that instead of teaching writing 
and critical thinking skills, First Year Composition (FYC) 
instructors were instead using their classrooms as coercive 
political platforms that were detrimental to students' 
educational needs. Hairston's solution was to limit writing 
classrooms only to student-text production. This thesis 
enters the discussion at this point by exploring Hairston's 
position, explicating the practices of those instructors 
Hairston claims indoctrinate students, critiquing the theory 
Hairston condemns for supporting those practices, and 
finally explaining possible ways to distinguish between 
teaching critical political and social inquiry and advancing 
lopsided political agendas in FYC classrooms. Findings 
conclude that although the use of political material does 
increase the possibility of coercive teaching practices, 
social-epistemic rhetoric (the primary theory proposing the 
use of political material in FYC) does not encourage 
political or social indoctrination. Furthermore, social- 
epistemic rhetoric expands on traditional composition 
theories and practices by including multiple perspectives on 
controversial topics, an understanding of discourse as
social and political, and a shift in traditional power
iii
relationships between students and instructors, all of 
which, as argued in this thesis, are necessary for 
productive critical inquiry into social and political 
discussions. Conclusions maintain, contrary to Hairston, 
that as long as certain criteria are utilized, FYC is a
legitimate environment for discussions concerning political
and social topics.
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CHAPTER ONE
HAIRSTON'S POSITION
Instructors and administrators' assumptions regarding 
what makes writing instruction "good" often are anchored in 
firm but unarticulated beliefs, experiences, and
actions—what Stephen North refers to as "teaching lore."
This uniquely positions the study of writing in the academy.
Unlike science or math, where curricula and assessment are
often agreed upon and universalized, composition scholars 
and teachers have rarely been able to agree upon a single 
set of effective and appropriate strategies for teaching 
writing. As a result, conflicting scholarly theories and an 
emphasis on pedagogical research riddle the field of 
composition; in fact, no other college discipline, aside 
from educational theory, pays as much attention to pedagogy 
as does composition studies, nor does any discipline 
disagree as much about instructional practices as do 
composition scholars and practitioners.
Contributing to composition's disagreement on 
scholarship and practice, writing is rarely isolated. 
Instead, writing is understood through relationships with 
other "borrowed" subjects that help facilitate the skills 
necessary to reinforce the different elements of writing. 
Because of this, and for the purposes of this thesis,
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writing pedagogy will be examined in two categories: the 
specific principles of writing and the subjects or vehicles 
through which those principles are facilitated (for similar 
distinctions, see Brodkey's "visible and invisible
curricula" (193)). I will refer to the former category as
the primary curriculum and the latter as the secondary 
curriculum. The primary curriculum assumes qualities that
can be found within the structure and style of writing 
itself: diction, form, syntax, mechanics, rhetoric, 
argumentative structure (deductive/inductive reasoning, 
supportive evidence), etc., while the qualities of a 
secondary curriculum include the examined topic (literature, 
feminism, foreign policy), along with its particular
conventions. For example, the secondary curriculum may 
include reading, understanding, and responding to a variety 
of sources on multiculturalism, from which students may 
derive an essay on twenty-first century suburban racism.
The primary curriculum then includes the writing objectives 
encouraged by these activities.
Over the years, debates over the intersection of
composition's primary and secondary curriculum have created 
much controversy. White and Polin's 1986 California Report 
exemplifies the contention between primary and secondary 
curricula in its six most common patterns of composition
2
instruction: 1. Literature Approach. 2. Peer Workshop 
Approach. 3. Individualized Writing Lab Approach. 4. 
Text-Based Rhetoric Approach. 5. Basic Skills Approach.
6. Service Course Approach. The six approaches, however, 
reduce writing instruction to three basic assumptions: 1. 
Writing should discuss student texts (primary curriculum 
only); 2. Writing should discuss professional writings 
(primary curriculum is taught through a secondary 
curriculum); 3. Writing can be reduced to its respective 
parts and should therefore consist of instruction in correct 
grammar and usage (White 42-44). The classic
Elbow/Bartholomae debate over "writers" and "academics"
articulates the theoretical parity of the first two, while 
the third, almost in contempt of consistent findings on non-
inclusive grammar instruction, speaks simply to the
difficulty and frustration instructors encounter when 
reading error-filled student texts.
Currently, as in the past, all three vie to become the
vanguard of composition instruction. However, both current 
traditionalism and expressivism, particularly in their pure
forms, have lost favor with contemporary scholars. For
example, although many compositionists believe that personal 
writing is an important element of good writing, most
composition scholars at least envision a need for students
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to understand and participate within the academic
stadium—rife with conventions, forms, voices, and ideas that
are often alien to students and consequently important for 
their participation within the academy. Few contest the 
importance of this kind of practical orientation to post­
secondary education. Yet, as composition courses enter the 
domain of other disciplines, genres, and political proving- 
grounds, issues surrounding the bias present in these 
secondary curricula become more endemic to the conversation.
The slow demise of current traditionalism, the myopia 
Of expressivism, and the greater acceptance of postmodern 
theories such as social-epistemic rhetoric (and the 
community of voices and influences it represents) have led 
compositionists to devote more instructional time to essay 
content (Brodkey 193). In turn, this places a greater 
responsibility on instructors to teach critical thinking 
within the context of multiple discourses and their 
discordant social and political voices, a skill that is 
often expected of instructors but is usually neglected in 
pedagogical training and traditionally in theory as well. 
Adding to this responsibility, during the last decade, as 
composition curricula have become more politicized (Hairston 
180), composition theory has battled to stay abreast and is 
only recently—within the last decade or so—struggling with
4
the importance of distinguishing between critical thinking 
and pushing preset political/social ideologies (Halasek
117) .
Perhaps the most controversial article on the topic, 
Maxine Hairston's Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing 
criticizes compositionists for inundating First Year 
Composition (FYC) with overt leftist political ideologies:
I see a new model emerging for freshman writing 
programs, a model that disturbs me greatly. It's 
a model that puts dogma before diversity, politics 
before craft, ideology before critical thinking,
and the social goals of the teacher before the
educational needs of the student [. . . .] It's a
model that doesn't take freshman English seriously 
in its own right but conceives of it as a tool,
something to be used [. . . . Everywhere I turn I
find composition faculty, both leaders in the
profession and new voices, asserting that they
have not only the right, but the duty, to put
ideology and radical politics at the center of
their teaching. (180)
Although the article met with indignation from many
composition scholars, who argued that classrooms were
inevitably political and that Hairston's -attack itself was
5
political rather than scholarly, the distinction she implies 
between encouraging critical thinking and advocating preset 
ideological agendas raises an important concern in
Composition instruction and scholarship. Because FYC 
classrooms claim the responsibility of encouraging critical 
thinking, and because critical'thinking is more recently 
being taught through social and/or political ideologies, the 
line between setting an agenda and encouraging critical 
inquiry can be dangerously thin. Thus, this study proposes
to explore Hairston's criticism of composition's political 
and ideological positioning, to explicate the practices of
the theorists she claims "cross over the line," to critique 
the theory she condemns for supporting these practices, and 
ultimately to conclude, based on these findings, what are 
and what are not constructive ways of distinguishing between 
teaching critical political and social inquiry and advancing 
lopsided political agendas in the FYC classroom.
Hairston opens her article with allusions to a variety 
of scholars whom she accuses of "[. . .] asserting that they
have not only the right, but the duty, to put ideology and 
radical politics at the center of their teaching" (180) .
She calls on linguist John Searle for support, who concurs,
stating that
6
The most congenial home left for Marxism . .]
is in the departments of literary criticism [. . . 
M] any professors [,.. .] teach it as a means of 
achieving left-wing political goals or as an
occasion for exercises in deconstruction. (Searle
38)
Hairston validates Searle's position, blaming critical 
literary theories such as deconstruction, post­
structuralism, and Marxist critical theory for "[. . . ]
trickl[ing] down to the lower floors of English 
departments," and that the justification for using these 
theories in FYC classrooms are "[. . . ] silly, simplistic,
and undemonstrable" (184-5). She continues, charging that
the goals met through these theories push students to see 
English as the "[. . .] dialect of the dominant class [. . . 
that] merely reinforces the status quo and serves the 
interest of the dominant class" instead of helping students 
master the standard dialect, which she posits is a more 
constructive, realistic, and less politicized goal (185).
As a solution, Hairston proffers a twofold schema:.
First, students' own writing must be the center of
the course. Students need to write to find out
how much they know and to gain confidence in their
ability to express themselves effectively [. . .
7
.] Second, as writing teachers we should stay 
within our area of professional expertise: helping
students to learn to write in order to learn, to
explore, to communicate, to gain control over 
their lives [. . . .] We have no business getting 
into areas where we may have passion and
conviction but no scholarly base from which to
operate. (187)
Hairston's position is accurate insofar as FYC, like any 
other course, should not become a forum for political and
social indoctrination. In most universities and colleges, 
FYC is a mandatory course used to introduce students to 
writing at the post-secondary level. To use the class to 
"enlighten" students about the benighted position of various 
li'minal groups or to force them into seeing the inherent 
oppressiveness of capitalism is, as Hairston claims, to "[.
. . ] severely limit [. . . the] freedom of expression for 
both students and instructors" (191) while relegating FYC to 
nothing more than eighteen weeks of exactly the kind of 
closed-ended investigations and argumentation that FYC is
assumed to remedy.
The difficulty, however, exists when FYC is divided 
into its respective functions. On many college and 
university campuses, FYC is used to introduce students to
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academic forms, styles, structures, language communities, 
grammatical conventions, and perhaps some of the concepts 
they will encounter in their other courses. In addition,
FYC is expected to introduce students to writing as an 
exploration, to understanding and using various rhetorical 
devices, and to very specific levels of analysis, critical 
inquiry, and support necessary to proactively complicate the 
political and social ideologies students encountered in 
their secondary education. In other words, composition 
courses are often given the duty of teaching students how to 
critically investigate a topic—something that is difficult 
to . facilitate without the various ideological positions of 
other academic and/or professional writers.
Hairston's antidote for the political pressure of 
influential writers and the teachers who may espouse their
theories is to establish a student-centered curriculum,
where students draw from their own experience for writing 
topics. To exemplify her aims, she creates a fictional 
Malawi student who discusses tribal legends of his homeland
and the significance of the ivory bracelet he wears on his
arm (192). The student, I assume, will tell the story of 
his heritage, highlighting the significance of the bracelet, 
then attempt to make that knowledge important to others who 
may be interested. On one hand, because the topic is
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student-generated (with the student being the assumed 
authority), the sample assignment does to some degree 
safeguard teachers from espousing political/social 
ideologies. This, in turn, also neutralizes students' 
tendencies to follow the political ideologies of the 
instructor for a grade, because the only agenda established 
will be the student's own. The assignment could, in fact, 
also generate more interest than one assigned by the 
instructor, as, at least theoretically, students will write
on what interests them most—all of which are important
considerations for FYC instructors.
The problem, however, still lies in the expectations 
of a FYC class. As stated earlier, FYC is more than 
functional literacy or basic skills. Most composition 
classes have either a basic writing prerequisite or a
placement score that assumes students are already to a large 
degree functionally literate. Although they purport to 
address issues of coherence, punctuation, proofreading, and 
editing, many colleges and universities focus the class on 
improving students' ability to write intelligently, and to 
read, think, respond, and write reflectively about what they 
read. Thus, writing at the college- level means more than 
form, grammar, and reiterating what students have already
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learned; in short, writing classrooms become a space for the
early stages of scholarship and intellectual struggle.
One essential element, and perhaps the only generally
accepted tie to the different disciplines of post-secondary 
scholarship, is the presence of conflicting ideas, which are 
also at the root of critical thinking and ideological 
formation. Although Hairston does indeed mention critical 
thinking and its importance in her article, she excludes 
political and social theories from this lens, because of the
dangers of inculcation they present. However, she assumes
that these theories will be touted without complication. If
she is correct and these theories are maintained without
multiple voices, then I would agree with Hairston's fears, 
because, without challenge, political and social theories 
can be maintained without complexity, and students' choices 
are left to the whims of creativity and belief. Thinking
critically about any topic shapes the way it is constructed,
deconstructed, and then reconstructed with a more
knowledgeable base of information from which to speak and 
make further inquiry. Traditionally, critical thought 
requires students to at the very least find a position 
(thesis statement), while mustering requisite evidence to 
support the discovery of new information and conclusions 
(Brodkey 236). To take this further and situate it within
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the specific influence of social and political theories, 
students' claims, if conflicting voices are present, become 
partial and provisional statements about the world. Without 
the presence of other voices, their positions become stacked 
claims masquerading as unarguable and immutable truths with 
which readers must either agree or disagree whole-heartedly 
(Brodkey 236). In this situation, if they do not consider 
dissenting points of view, students risk leaving the 
argument without having examined it from more than one 
position, a move that leaves students without the critical 
and rhetorical authority needed for sustained inquiry into 
difficult topics. Including a variety of dissenting 
arguments on the same issue "[. . .] encourages students to 
step back and walk around a proposition, examining its 
construction and looking, in particular, for the gaps and 
fissures, the telltale signs of covert interests, dogmas, 
and desires" (Fitts and France 15). Thus, "Avoiding 
political issues [. . .] even if possible, would fail to 
engage students in those very rhetorical practices that
articulate and validate knowledge" (15).
This conclusion, however, may present the dangers for 
which Hairston condemns many current writing programs. As 
Hairston concludes, instead of- allowing a fair and
substantial range of diverse interpretations of topics,
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composition teachers, because of their own political biases, 
may inevitably force those biases onto students as the 
correct or plausible answer to the topic, even if several 
conflicting voices are present. Or, presenting even more of 
a danger, students will pick up the hints of bias and 
attempt to parrot that point of view. Either of these is 
possible. Yet, the question is whether this is as dangerous
or as universal as Hairston claims.
An ideological stance, according to Hairston, only 
includes the student's or teacher's position without the 
validation of other perspectives; thus, Hairston uses 
ideology as a four-letter word, connecting it to phrases 
like "radical politics" or opposing it with undefined 
notions of critical thinking (180), both of which relegate 
ideology to the level of dangerous opinions and/or 
unsupported beliefs. Although the word has these 
connotations, if taken literally, ideology lays out a 
pattern of argumentation that supports its conclusions and 
discloses its weaknesses. In other words, exposing an 
ideology would not only highlight the conclusions but also 
the premises, their sources, the construction and ordering 
of those sources, and the inferences drawn to form the 
conclusion(s). If taken in their complexity rather than 
their ends, ideologies become the intellectual spaces for
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negotiating claims and information, " [. . . ] environments [.
. . that] provide [. . .] a continual source of critical 
tension (Fritts and France 22). In other words, if 
instructors are to take an ideological stance on an issue,
all of the elements of that stance should be laid out
together with the conclusions as a position for students to 
negotiate in and around instead of as absolute truths. The 
ideology, therefore, must necessarily "[. . .] view [. . .]
argumentation as a prologue to further inquiry [. . .
instead of] as performances that invariably end with winners 
and losers, and, ultimately, in silence" (Brodkey 236).
This does, however, require instructors to relinquish a 
significant amount of authority in the classroom, as their 
ideological positions become as unstable as their students'.
Although few compositionists would openly discourage 
students from becoming critical readers of difficult 
texts—as this allows them to position and negotiate within 
the dissenting views of an argument—what may be less obvious 
but more dangerous is when instructors indirectly discourage 
students from critiquing the instructor's authority, which
can be looked at as its own text. Thus, the double standard 
of asking students to be critical of all ideological 
positions except the instructor's may contribute to the 
mimicry that Hairston posits. To defend a position as
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immutable truth sends a twofold message to students: 1) that 
knowledge is static once it is described by an authority or 
institution, and 2) that critical inquiry is based on 
unwarranted assumptions that reduce education to a game of 
inquiry only to the point that students reach prescribed 
conclusions. Thereby, students' only inquiry is into the 
instructor's biases, and making the grade becomes knowing 
the roads that the instructor took to get there. This is 
especially dangerous if the instructor does not fully 
recognize the bias present in his/her own position, or if
the instructor's biases are constructed under a more
elaborate and less visible umbrella of weakly-supported
claims that work together to equal a narrow, immutable
vision of a particular topic.
Recently, during one of my FYC classes, I queried
students on what the introductory lectures to the class had
to do with writing in general. The preceding lectures had 
been rough political critiques paired with a quick probing
into students' understanding of and access to information 
from a variety of popular media. I used two primary
examples of which I was sure few students were aware: the 
fairly recent and successful protest against President 
Clinton's Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and
President George W. Bush's "Gag Order" on giving federal
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monies to international free clinics who discuss abortion as
a reproductive alternative. My initial intent was to show 
how superficial information or a lack of information 
altogether could lead to a disparate reading when compared 
to a deeper look at a variety of sources. On a larger 
scale, I wanted to provide students with a broad-strokes 
look at their responsibilities as FYC students and as 
students becoming scholars, as their task would be to take 
headlines and bylines (surface readings), understand their 
initial reactions to them, then complicate their reactions
with further research and a revision of their original 
position. Ultimately, students had to compare their "gut" 
reactions to their "informed" understanding of the topic and
discuss the changes and the reasons behind them.
However democratic I assumed the lectures and the
assignment to be—after all, I was using presidents from both 
popular parties, and my only bias seemed against a lack of 
investigative integrity on the part of the media—when 
questioning the students as to what this had to do with the 
class or with writing in general, one brave soul raised her
hand and said, "It seems your class has some kind of
political agenda."
Although I quickly explained that the only political
agenda I had for the class was for students to become
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active, critical participants in an ongoing conversation, I 
felt for the first time that any suggestion of political 
content could, as Hairston presents, be viewed as 
politically dangerous and that I, in turn, could be viewed 
as an ideologue, pushing an unwarranted agenda onto students 
who did not wish to or who should, not wish to accept it.
More importantly, however, I began to question what Kay
Halasek explains as "The unexamined assumption [. . .] that
people who take the time and make the effort to become 
informed will necessarily turn to critique what the critical 
pedagogues themselves define as injustice, discrimination, 
or oppression" (118) . Said another way, although I wanted 
students to become critically engaged with issues that had
multiple viewpoints, I was also pushing that they accept 
politics as inherently corrupt and media as the vehicle for
maintaining that corruption.
Looking back at some of the old essays I have kept from 
previous classes, I begin to understand that although the 
comments suggest a variety of stances on the arguments and
support surrounding the issues, I do pressure students to
accept my world view that power is corrupt and oppressive,
that social systems can work to reduce corruption and
inequality, and that critical engagement—with a bias toward 
corporations and government—is essential to a functional
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democracy. In short, I push an ideology, and although I am 
critical with those students who share my views, I am less
so than with those who dissent.
In my defense, I could call on aid from resistance 
pedagogues such as Paulo Freire, bell hooks, Patricia 
Bizzell, Nancy Welsh, etc. to validate my position.
However, to do so would be more of a justification than an 
exploration, with the obvious conclusion that what I have 
been doing is morally, politically, and theoretically 
sustainable. Instead, I posit that my own ideology, 
although perhaps better supported than many students', is as 
fraught with emotional and political bias as any other. The 
difficulty, of course, is what to do with that 
understanding. To simply state my bias, as I did to some 
extent when my student raised the issue, is not enough to
dispel the possibility that students will mimic me for the 
grade. Yet, the fact that some students are willful enough 
to stage such resistance may contribute to a resolution.
According to Kay Halasek, "Coming to critical awareness 
(and with it critical reading and writing ability) is a
process constrained by social forces and institutions"
(119). Inversely, critical awareness is a process unbound
by those same forces and institutions. Said another way, 
confinement exists only in relation to freedom; the converse
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is true as well. Thus, an inmate who has lived a year in 
solitary confinement will recognize the need for freedom in 
a variety of ways different from one whose confinement 
consists of the general prison population. Each one, 
depending on the severity of the punishment, will recognize 
freedom as a set of rules that s/he must abide by, or, in 
other terms, in relation to what s/he can or cannot get away
with. Students in FYC are under similar circumstances
insofar as they enter at differing levels of "ideological 
becoming," with diverse levels and means of negotiating 
authoritarian discourse (qtd. in Halasek 120). Some 
students have already developed rigid ideologies, while 
others are still searching for theories to support their 
world experience. In either case, compositionists have a 
responsibility to offer "[. . .] situated writing through
which a student struggles to engage and orient herself and 
her beliefs," even though the acquired ends may differ 
significantly from student to student (emphasis Halasek 
120). The assumption that instructors can understand the 
sundry ways students will put their FYC experiences to later
use supports an egotistical fallacy that works only as far 
as it justifies the instructor's practices. Students, 
though walking out of our classes with similar skills, will 
put those skills to a variety of purposes suited to their
19
needs. Thus, students entering FYC, though perhaps ignorant 
of those purposes at the time, will utilize the class 
depending on how they understand their own needs, strengths, 
and deficits in writing and thinking. For some, the class 
entails reading with and thereby understanding texts. For 
others, who may have developed a critical stance against 
authority, the class will become a "resistant form of
discourse" (124). The composition instructor then becomes
another text in which students, depending on their critical 
outlook, will accept as "the authority" or as simply another 
position with which students must negotiate.
According to William Perry and Mary Belenky et al., 
students move through a relatively systematic intellectual 
and ethical development that begins with a basic duality and 
ends with a kind of ethical relativism. "Each stage in the 
process represents a different epistemological mode or 
stance through which students progress in their roles as 
learners" (Halasek 129). Those at the earlier stages of 
their development may tend to, as Hairston suggests, "mimic"
the texts they encounter as they attempt to appropriate the
language and ideas present. Those who have moved beyond 
that position will continue "[ . . .] building their own 
self-knowledge, achieving a sense of autonomy and individual 
voice, a sense of independent choice within a socially
20
constructed world" (130). Consequently, instructors are 
left in a somewhat precarious position as they ultimately 
have little to do with the way students interact with the 
information they receive. Some students may in fact parrot 
the instructor, and therefore the instructor's ideologies, 
while others will already understand the instructor as one 
voice contributing to a variety of voices on an issue.
What instructors can do, however, is contribute to
students' critical development by presenting information in 
a way that invites critical responses that move beyond a 
dualistic stance rather than allowing students to sit idle 
with their initial presumptions. Hairston's Malawi student's 
report, for example, offers no critical way into the
material except through the form and style of the student's 
prose. These elements are important to forming those
skills, but the instruction lacks any attempt to help 
students move beyond a dualistic response, since the "[. .
.] process of critical reading [and thinking], defined as an 
inquiry into one's relationship with a text [subject] and 
its hero [position], entails both passive reception and
active engagement" (131). Paramount to this process, as 
Peter Elbow suggests, is information that invites students
to both "doubt and believe" (131) . Hairston's Malawi
student seems to require only the latter, both for the
21
student writing and for the listening audience, since to 
engage the writer critically, the audience would have to 
possess an insight on the subject greater than that which I 
expect most students'have concerning Malawi customs.
To contain the class within the narrow scope of 
students' personal preferences and interests seems to renege 
on composition's promise to create challenging environments 
rich in diverse perspectives. This also indirectly tells 
students that the kinds of writing they will encounter 
during their tenure will be nothing more than personal 
storytelling, and that their audiences will be as forgiving ■
of them as were their uninformed classmates, or that their
instructors will remain socially and politically neutral on 
the topics they choose to write. These assumptions, as any
student or instructor knows, are false. Students
encountering any political and social discourse will be 
forced to renegotiate personal bias, to include a variety of 
conflicting voices on the subject, and to construct an 
ideology based on that information. To assume that there 
will be no obstruction to their theories if their prose are 
merely error-free and coherent is like looking at a
difficult situation and suddenly declaring oneself blind.
22
CHAPTER TWO
EXAMINING OTHER VOICES
As established in chapter one, productive critical 
inquiry into political and social topics within a FYC course 
depends upon multiple, dissonant voices competing for 
ideological acceptance. In this context, students' critical
tasks are to wade through these voices and understand the
-parameters of a given discussion, to create an initial
position on the topic, and to enter the conversation, with 
the attendant responsibility of synthesizing the voices with 
their own to come to a logical, provisional stance on the 
topic. In doing so, students' nascent views are complicated 
to form more Sophisticated ideologies. The intersection for 
further controversy, however, is if and in what ways 
instructors' ideologies directly or indirectly influence the 
kind of lop-sided advocacy that Hairston claims,- or whether
the presence of this influence facilitates the kind of fair­
handed inquiry that is required to challenge students within 
competing discourses. Using the- above criteria for
analysis, this chapter will explicate four of the theorists. 
Hairston claims use the classroom as a political platform to 
the detriment of students' own ideological becoming.
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As suggested previously, even if the deck of the class
is stacked in favor of a particular ideological stance, some 
students, based on the fact that they are intelligent, 
thinking adults with the capacity to form well-supported 
ideologies, will challenge the instructor's biases and 
authority and, contrary to Hairston's claims, come to their 
own conclusions after reasoning through the position and/or 
rhetorical power of the instructor. However, only highly
skilled, sophisticated, and determined students are likely
to successfully do so, given certain social realities of the
classroom—i.e. the instructor is the final judge of
students' abilities and therefore has - the power to accept or 
reject the validity of students' positions. Regardless of
their sophistication, students also come to their classrooms
assuming that because teachers are the governing, educated
authority, students are there to learn what instructors have 
to teach. In addition, what students are required to learn 
is often blurred by the confusing overlap of primary and 
secondary curricula. For example, if the class is
established around the theme of technology, does that mean 
students need to become, proficient users of technology? 
quasi-scholars on technology issues? proficient writers?
or all of the above? And, does a passing grade mean
assuming the instructor's potentially biased views on
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technology? or, merely supporting a view on technology 
within the governing bodies of knowledge already established 
on the subject? To freshman, who think their FYC classes 
are going to be about "writing," understanding the various 
permutations of the class in the short span of ten to 
eighteen weeks while learning to write clear, concise, 
coherent, well-supported academic essays may be more than 
they can handle—especially if the course objectives are 
couched in vague or confusing terms. In this environment,
instructors' biases can be seductive alternatives for
students who feel like they are flailing inside a
conversation that is over their heads, with interlocutors—
authors and instructors—who are way out of their league, 
especially (and this is the rub) when those authorities may 
not play fairly. Whether we like it or not, instructors
have the power of veto; unlike students' arguments,
teachers' arguments do not always require adequate support. 
Thus, within this tricky maze of value, support, and 
authority, Hairston's claims take on more validity. Given
an environment that is particularly fertile for acceptance
and indoctrination, compositionists may in fact commandeer 
their students' ideologies directly or indirectly by 
asserting weighted political and social ideologies.
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To support her position, Hairston invokes four popular 
composition scholars, whom she cites as both representative 
of the field and part of the "[. . .] cultural left [who
have] claimed writing courses as their political territory" 
(184). The first of these theorists, Dale Bauer, according 
to Hairston, not only politicizes her course with a feminist 
agenda but then dismisses her students' resistance to the 
theories as nothing more than compliance within "the 
system." Bauer's article, "The Other 'F' Word: The Feminist 
in the Classroom," justifies some of Hairston's claims 
insofar as Bauer's political affiliation at times works to 
dismiss her students' positions as arbitrary or worse, in 
need of political "enlightenment."
As for the strengths of Bauer's class, establishing the
lens of feminism within the course legitimately challenges
students to see the world through a narrow perspective 
founded on specific governing assumptions, and thereby, it 
teaches the difficult lesson of analysis, a skill all
students will find useful in other classes and in their
lives. For example, Bauer may ask her students to analyze a 
particular article or situation while assuming a feminist's 
position and the attendant doctrines that govern it. This 
kind of practice is important and does not on its surface 
represent any particular bias. Furthermore, its particular
26
utility comes from the fact that many of the essays students
write for classes in and outside the humanities will ask
them to take one or several theories and apply them to a
particular situation. The practice also asks students—who 
often operate within the guidelines of personal experience., 
beliefs, and traditions—to see the world through a different 
perspective, which is useful in helping them reposition 
their argumentative stance in respect to social bodies of 
knowledge, a key element to productive analysis and critical 
Inquiry.
One of the theoretically challenging aspects of Bauer's 
class, however, is that she seems to take analysis one step 
further by asking her students to accept feminism not merely 
as one of several possible lenses or ways of looking at 
society but as the correct perspective, without offering
them any constructive ways of criticizing the social theory.
In other words, she asks students to be critical of the
hegemony but not of the authority that she maintains on the 
subject. For example, Bauer states, and I agree with her on 
this point, that "Precisely because [students] insist on 
[the separation between private or personal and the public 
space]', our.first task should be to show the personal is 
public" (385). Part of students' resistance to theoretical 
discussions is based on the individual exceptions they see
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in just about any theoretical framework presented.
Especially regarding feminism, these individual exceptions 
will be particularly insistent, since, as Bauer suggests, 
feminism is often "[. . .] identified with an alien,
radical, and threatening political position" (386). Yet, 
Bauer strains the course's integrity when she asks, "[. . .] 
how do we move ourselves out of this political impasse and 
resistance in order to get our students to identify with the 
political agenda of feminism?"- (387). Although I, too, have 
seen the sudden and often aggressive resistance to offering 
feminism as a valuable socio-political stance, I would also 
contend that feminism, like any other conglomerate of social
theories, "[. . .] has its own inevitable limitations, which
render it part of the dialogue of rhetorical statements 
rather than a transcendent position looking piously down
upon an otherwise benighted fray" (Knoblauch 136). Thus, 
Bauer's position suggests some level of coercion, as it 
looks for ways to persuade students to identify with, rather 
than critique, the feminist perspective. Furthermore, when 
students do engage in resistance, Bauer pigeon-holes their 
opposition by suggesting that "[. . .] students seem often 
quite unambiguously committed to the 'system'"(387). I 
would posit here that their commitment is much more than
unambiguous or "ambivalent," as Bauer also claims.
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In order for students to accept feminism as an accurate 
depiction of American culture and institutions, they must 
first accept—depending on the different school of feminist 
theory—that American social, political, and corporate
institutions are partriarchal, sexist, and oppressive, 
premises that are easy to exemplify but difficult to prove, 
especially to someone (male or female) who is sitting in a 
college classroom (American social institution) on his/her 
way to what s/he sees as a successful career. That in 
itself may appear contrary to what the feminist instructor 
is saying. To take it to the statistical level, if students 
look around, or move beyond the classroom in their research, 
they will also find that college populations around the 
country are, based on those numbers, equally
balanced—tipping slightly in favor of the females. This, in 
turn, implies that men and women are both equally empowered 
to move on to compete in the job market and thereby choose 
careers that are based not on their gender but according to 
their qualifications. This is not say that this is a 
complete, view of feminism, American educational
institutions, or corporate hiring practices. Much more 
research is necessary to support this claim; it does, 
however, confirm a valid angle students may see and feel
compelled to study in terms of understanding gender equality
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in higher learning. To me, this level of inquiry proves 
useful in the context of critical thinking, because it not 
only questions the so-called hegemony but feminism as well. 
The example also supports the notion that because students 
should be rightfully leery of accepting assumptions without 
adequate support, Bauer's class needs to at least study 
students' resistance to feminism as a potentially valid and 
supportable position.
Furthermore, I could validate Bauer's position if the 
course was an introduction to feminism. However, it is not. 
It is governed instead by the pedagogical assumptions of a 
writing classroom. Although, as stated before, those 
assumptions are malleable, what is imperative is that the 
secondary curriculum should be a means to improve critical 
inquiry and writing rather than an end to justify the 
political platform of the instructor. Bauer agrees on the 
surface, at least when she claims to foster critical 
thinking, but the agreement is complicated when she also 
proposes offering the goal of "emancipatory critical action" 
(389). The word emancipation means freedom from constraint;
it does not, however, include a definition of those
constraints. Although no realistic writing class should 
allow students absolute freedom, emancipation can mean 
freedom from a feminist construct, especially if established
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within the context of FYC and its goals of teaching analysis 
and critical thinking. This does not mean that students can 
merely react to feminism with half-cocked, home-grown 
truisms and prejudice and be allowed to establish that 
perspective based on a- whim. It does, on the other hand, 
mean that resistance to feminism is a. possible ideological 
position for students to legitimately attempt to argue.
One could reasonably argue that other classes do not 
offer students the choice to disagree with their theories, 
so why should Bauer's class be any different, especially 
given students' general ignorance of the tenets of feminism? 
The answer lies both in the subject being taught and in the
situated position of FYC. In a "content" course,
instructors are advertised as scholars specializing in the 
course's subject and therefore are assumed to be familiar
with the dominant and competing theories informing the 
topic, as well as with their limitations. If these 
instructors wish to promote critical’ analysis of the 
competing theories in their disciplines, then they too have 
the responsibility of including multiple perspectives on the 
topic. However, their positions are different to the extent 
they are not always expected to teach critical thinking, as
is composition. Because of the students' expectations of a
composition course, and because of the critical goals that
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most composition courses claim- to help facilitate, secondary- 
curricula is, by default, not governed solely by the 
instructor but by the authority of the collective audience. 
In this way, the accuracy or truth regarding the theories
studied becomes contextualized and relative, based on
relevant support and justification of the participants, 
instead of on mimicry and regurgitation of the hegemonic
views.
Still, Bauer, as well as Patricia Bizzell—one of the 
other four implicated in Hairston's article—view this 
position as somewhat wrong-headed or inhumane, claiming that 
teaching critical thinking without promoting an ideology 
inadvertently asks students to be critical of theories 
without giving them something to believe. Bauer states, "In 
my defense, I would say, following Charles Paine, that we 
[teachers who promote an agenda] must accept our roles as 
rhetoricians" (.388) . Bizzell concurs and supports baldly 
indoctrinating students, arguing that critical thinking does 
not offer anything for students to believe in beyond anti-
foundationalism and its ambivalent conclusion, ethical
relativism. As Bizzell states,
We exercise authority over [students] in asking 
them to give up these foundational beliefs, but we 
give them nothing to put in the place of these
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-foundational beliefs because we deny the validity 
of all authority, including, presumably, our own.
(670)
Bauer takes this one step further, introducing feminism as 
the lost key to the puzzle:
It is not enough to foster critical thinking; we 
need to suggest something in the place of what we
tear down when we ask students to resist cultural
hegemony [....] In short, I would argue that
political commitment—especially feminist 
commitment—is a legitimate classroom strategy and
rhetorical imperative. The feminist agenda offers 
a goal towards our students' conversions to 
emancipatory critical action. (389)
The implications of this interchange are as frightening as 
they are.complex. There is no doubt that ethical relativism 
for students is much like feeling schizophrenia descend over 
a once well-ordered pattern of thought. It is equally 
disturbing in that relativism is not an acceptable
conclusion to critical thinking about political or social
discourse. Instructors rightfully and willfully demand 
answers to the puzzles—whatever the puzzles may be. Bauer
and Bizzell are not only accurate, but I would say
compassionate, in their assumptions that students need to
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believe in something and that teachers need to offer a so- 
called "way out" for those caught in the anti-
foundationalist void.
However, I would argue that offering students a variety 
of choices within a topic is offering them an array of 
ideologies to choose from and at least the freedom to argue 
a variety of supportable standpoints—certainly this is a way 
out of anti-foundationalism. Although students' standpoints 
will still only be provisionally true, students will at 
least have explored the topic to the extent that they find a 
girded authority in which to validate their positions, 
whatever those positions may be. In this construct, 
students are still required to grapple with difficult and 
provocative ideologies, while retaining the respect and 
authority necessary to deconstruct positions that are 
antithetical to their personal or political needs. In this 
way, instructors will in fact ask students to put their 
beliefs on hold when they invite students into the polyvocal 
arena of academic argumentation. Instructors will also ask 
that students defer judgment until they have a richer 
understanding of the subject; however, authority is 
validated, not by instructors agreeing with the students' 
positions but instead by acknowledging the way students 
support and construct valid arguments, regardless of any
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political affiliations they assume. And I would add here, 
in concert with Bizzell, that "[. . .] a consensus can only 
be achieved through collective participation in the 
rhetorical process" (673). Yet, the instructor's—and 
arguably the students'—rhetoric should at least attempt to 
be equally effective on multiple fronts instead of "[. .
. ] openly exert [ing . ,. . ] authority [. . .] to try to
persuade students to agree with [the instructor's] values" 
(672). Although Bizzell contends that open persuasion will 
"[. . .] collectively generate trustworthy knowledge and 
beliefs conducive to the common good" (671), Bizzell's 
position and Bauer's assume, without support, that they know 
what is ideologically best for both our culture and our 
students—positions that are fundamentally complicated and
diverse.
This is not to say, however, that instructors must stay
completely neutral on a topic, for at least to some extent, 
this may be unrealistic. Arguably, even if composition 
instructors choose to incorporate contentious voices—as they 
should—they may still end up indirectly championing their
own. The question instead becomes, what can instructors do 
to offer the richest environment possible for a fair and 
rewarding interplay between contending theories? C. H.
Knoblauch and Charles Paine—the other two scholars most
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indicted by Hairston—argue for similar reasons that the way
truths are constructed and deconstructed in the classroom is
perhaps the most important element for achieving a robust
and uninhibited debate.
Paine, on the one hand, champions the notion of 
inculcating students into the teachers' ideologies:
[. . .] it is of course reasonable—if it is what 
we believe—to try to inculcate into our students
the conviction that the dominant order is
repressive, that they should feel angered by the
injustices done to others, that an emancipatory 
vision be formulated, and its praxis should be
exercised. (564)
Yet, he qualifies the statement, suggesting that the harm in 
such a position exists more in the way knowledge is 
constructed than in the instructor's belief in a particular 
ideology: "If [. . .] theorists [. . .] truly believe all 
structures of knowledge and evaluation are relative, they 
must realize their vision for emancipation is also relative, 
or [. . .] radically contingent on their personal economies"
(563). Thus, according to Paine, "If we wish our students 
to remain open-minded, we need to demonstrate our openness
to the ideas of students and others" (564). Knoblauch
offers a similar position on the persuasive power of
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instructors' ideologies and their limitations, when he
states,
[. . .] since conversations seldom entail equal/
distributions of power or authority, our speech 
may well have to be boldly denunciative at times
if it is to affect its hearers in the midst of
their intellectual and political comfort. At the
same time, if we are not, like Pogo, to discover
that the enemy is us, we are also compelled to
review our choices and monitor our commitments, 
scrupulously, not in their abstract sufficiency, 
but in their "consequences" as we exercise them in 
the world. We are obliged to announce ourselves
so that, through the very process of self- 
assertion, we grow more conscious of our axioms
and submit that awareness to public debate. (139) 
Therefore, both Knoblauch and Paine accept their "role[s] as
manipulator[s]" (Paine 563) but with the caveat that
ideologies, especially the dominant (teacher's) ideologies, 
must be transparent and subject to the same critical 
attention as those the instructor is attempting to admonish 
for their oppressive qualities. Although I am personally 
less comfortable with overtly manipulating students into 
accepting my view as the correct view, I agree with
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Knoblauch's and Paine's positions insofar as they offer 
students a critical model of acceptance and a constructive 
way of doubting, because they treat knowledge as contingent, 
changeable, and yet something to fight for. Their positions 
also address Hairston's concerns that leftist composition 
instructors do nothing more than champion their own beliefs. 
Instructors can potentially maintain political positions as 
long as those instructors who do accept leftist constructs 
are not so deeply entrenched in their own ideologies as to 
support the notion that
[. . .] when students understand that they are
oppressed by the structure of capitalism, the 
light bulb will turn on, and they will become 
critical thinkers; that is, the development of 
critical thinking skills is unnecessary because
the truth has been revealed to them. (561)
On the contrary, to help students resist indoctrination—in 
this case the hegemony of the classroom—instructors must
assume that "[. . .] emancipation conveys different visions
to different persons and groups, and the means to that 
emancipation and what exactly it consists of must therefore 
be explored during the'process of education" (562).
Thus, to accept Bauer and Bizzell's view that feminism,
or any other ideological construct, is an acceptable
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ideological position for an entire class is to set one 
socio-political theory above all others, to create a limited 
and biased view on a topic, and to distrust the dialectic 
process. The position also assumes that instructors know 
what is ideologically "best" for a varied group of
sophisticated adults with diverse experiences and needs-a 
position that is itself oppressive and better left, I
believe, to the students themselves. In these regards, if 
instructors are to assume stances on subjects, in order to 
overcome the seductive desire for the pots to call the 
kettles black, instructors' positions need to be
"realistically" challenged to the extent—or perhaps more
so—than the other so-called oppressive theories that are 
critically examined.. In this vein, instructors are not 
forced to relinquish their ideological positions, nor are 
they championing their cause to the detriment of their
students' critical needs; instead, they are simply forced to 
challenge and support their own ideologies in the same ways 
they ask of their students, and thus, model the very
processes they teach.
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CHAPTER THREE
EXPLICATING THE THEORY
Although levied at individual practitioners and 
scholars, Hairston's claims indict social-epistemic rhetoric 
as the cornerstone of instructors' political coercion in the 
classroom. Her concerns are at least partially justified, 
given the practitioners she has represented—at least half of 
whom, upon further study, openly supported not only the
desire but the right to foreground their political views in
the classroom and even to "manipulate" students into
agreeing with them. However, the question remains whether 
the theory connecting these practices rationalizes these
actions. James Berlin's work with rhetoric and social and
political studies—in particular "Rhetoric and Ideology in 
the Writing Class" and Rhetorics , Poetics, and Cultures—is 
considered by many to be the center of social-epistemic
rhetoric. Thus, this chapter will explicate these works in
order to decide whether social epistemic rhetoric pushes 
instructors to practice political coercion in their
classrooms.
A quick overview of social-epistemic rhetoric places 
political and social ideologies as the focus of study. 
According to Berlin,
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Social-epistemic rhetoric is an alternative that 
is self-consciously aware of its ideological 
stand, making the very question of ideology the 
center of classroom activities, and in so doing 
providing itself a defense against preemption and 
a strategy for self-criticism and self-correction.
("Rhetoric . . 478)
' IBerlin's justification for placing ideology at the center of
the writing class comes from his view that any rhetoric is 
"[. . .] always already ideological" (477). As he explains
in chapterifive of Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures, "[. .
..] no set of signifying practices, can lay claim to a 
disintefested pursuit of transcendental truth; all are 
engaged in the play of power and politics., regardless of 
their intentions" (77). Because language is layered in 
social currencies, no use of language can be considered
politically neutral. Thus, the ways we study language in 
classrooms, according to Berlin, would need to include an 
analysis not only of the uses, forms, structures, and styles
of language but also the politics supporting those dominant 
and recurring elements. To state it more succinctly, Berlin 
concludes that we need to study the ways we create, use, and 
profit from language as well as the ways language (and, 
therefore, the people, relationships, and systems who
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control and guard.it) use us. In short, instead of ridding 
language of ideology, he argues that we must recognize that 
it is an inextricable component and make it a part of our
study.
On the other hand, Hairston posits that a writing class
should ,
[. . .. ] teach writing for its own sake, as a 
primary intellectual activity, that is at the heart 
of a college education [. . . .] Writing courses, 
especially required freshman courses, should not
be for anything or about anything other than
writing itself, and how one uses it to learn and 
think and communicate. (emphases Hairston 179)
To exemplify, Hairston creates a student-centered
environment, using "students' topics" to create
"multicultural" student writing in a safe environment (192). 
Curiously, however, almost as an addendum, Hairston later 
revisits these "student topics" and states that personal 
writing is not enough, that a "broader range of discourse" 
is necessary. Her suggested themes for the course include: 
"[. . .] family or community rituals; power relationships at 
all levels; the student's role in his or her family or 
group; their roles as men and women; the myths they live by; 
cultural tensions within groups" (193).
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Even at a glance, the contradictions between Hairston's 
theoretical position, the practical application of her 
curriculum, and her condemnation of social-epistemic 
rhetoric are glaring. For example, it seems unlikely that 
students could study men's and women's roles without 
mentioning sexism. Even a cursory examination of gender 
reveals the potential for and justifications of unequal 
power distributions within gender relationships. Even more
difficult to reconcile are Hairston's claims that
compositionists need to move beyond personal writing but 
without including any professional or academic writing. As 
Hairston suggests, "[. . .] the focus should be on writing,
not reading" (191). She proceeds, saying that
[. . .] we can help students articulate and 
understand [their] experience, but we also have 
the important job of helping every writer to 
understand that each of us sees the world through 
our own particular lens, one shaped by unique 
experiences. In order to communicate with others, 
we must learn to see through their lenses as well
as try to explain to them what we see through
ours. (192)
Within this context, it appears both logical and necessary
to include a variety of perspectives, both students' and
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other writers', for the reasons that Hairston states and for
the well-documented connection between writing and reading. 
Indeed, understanding our own as well as others' lenses 
seems to invite just the kind of study of1 ideology Berlin 
describes. Yet, Hairston hedges. A final contradiction, 
however, and perhaps the most important, exists in 
Hairston's denial of social-epistemic rhetoric in the 
classroom, while still proffering parts of it as an example
for a course theme. Obviously, she finds social-
constructionism (the root of social-epistemology) a worthy
theoretical construct—at least she attempts to practice 
it—and clearly discussions of power relationships are 
endemic to social-epistemology; yet, she claims that a 
classroom should remain politically and ideologically 
neutral, both ’from the teacher's standpoint and from the
topic's standpoint. According to Hairston, we can study 
anything, read anything, discuss anything—including politics 
and ideologies—if, and only if, the topic(s) are generated 
and sustained by the students' interests. This is not only 
impractical and naive, but it is also antithetical to any 
college or university's description of FYC as an
introduction to academic writing. In short, although
Hairston's curriculum would, as she claims, create a
potentially safe place for students to compose, her attempts
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to practically establish an ideologically-neutral classroom 
seem flawed, not only by their practical and theoretical 
contradictions but by what appears to be a misunderstanding 
of social-epistemic rhetoric and its goals.
In reference to social-epistemic rhetoric, Hairston
states that
Those who want to bring their ideology into the 
classroom argue that since any classroom is 
necessarily political, the teacher might as well 
make it openly political and ideological. He or
she should be direct and honest about his or her
political beliefs; then the students will know 
where they stand and everyone can talk freely.
(189)
These statements imply that any study of political and 
social positions is necessarily-a study of the instructor's 
ideology. Furthermore, according to Hairston, studying 
ideology is then necessarily reduced to a battle of wills
between^the instructor and the students. A closer look at
social-epistemic rhetoric maintains almost a direct
opposition to Hairston's understanding. According to 
Berlin,;
[. . .] instead of rhetoric acting as the
transcendental recorder or arbiter of competing
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ideological claims, rhetoric is regarded as always 
already ideological. This position means that any
examination of a rhetoric must first consider the
ways its very discursive structure can be read so
as to favor one version of economic, social, and 
political arrangements over other versions. A 
rhetoric then considers competing claims in these 
three realms from an ideological perspective made
possible both by its,constitution and by its 
application—the dialectical interaction between 
the rhetoric as text and the interpretive 
practices brought to it. ("Rhetoric . . 477)
To break this down, Berlin posits that rhetoric itself is
situated within and therefore acting for (and against) a 
confluence of political or social interests. In other 
words, the power play and economic exchange between
convictions is what facilitates the need for the rhetoric in
the first place. To accept any truth, even the lens through 
which one attempts to establish truth, is to indirectly 
portray one set of beliefs as more correct, useful, or 
perhaps better than another. Thus, the first step in 
understanding the rhetoric is to ask, in terms of power, who 
or what do particular rhetorical conventions seem to favor? 
Endemic to that process is an exploration of how its forms,
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structures, and patterns attempt to serve its purposes. For 
example, Berlin claims that "[. .. .] the rhetoric of 
cognitive psychology refuses the ideological question, 
resting secure instead in its scientific examination of the 
composing process" (483). Yet, he suggests that
It is possible, however, to see this rhetoric as 
being eminently suited to appropriation by the 
proponents of a particular ideological stance, a 
stance consistent with the modern college's
commitment to preparing students for the world of 
corporate capitalism. (483)
The class' study, therefore, is to discover whether
cognitive rhetorical patterns shape the relationship between 
higher education and corporate culture. Although Berlin 
proffers a potential conclusion to the study: that cognitive 
rhetoric supports the fallacy that "The existent, the good, 
and the possible are inscribed in the very nature of things 
as indisputable scientific facts, rather than being seen as 
humanly devised social constructions always remaining open 
to discussion" (485), this conclusion remains tentative and 
open, as only one of many competing ideologies in a forum of 
other contentious theories. Other theories, if adequately 
supported, become, at least hypothetically, true to the
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extent that they function to establish and support a 
particular interplay of power relationships.
Within this socially-constructed public arena, 
ideologies, including the lens through which the positions 
are studied, "[. . .] provide [. . .] a defense against 
preemption and a strategy for self-criticism and self­
correction" (478). Thus, Hairston's claim that social-
epistemology suggests "[. . .] any teacher should be free to 
use his dr her classroom to promote any ideology" (189) 
seems myopic. Given the necessity to foreground the
ideology inherent in any claim, the instructor's claims, if 
promoted, must be discussed and fall under the same 
scrutiny. For example, to use one of Hairston's topics—that 
she claims represents the "logic of the cultural left"
(189)—abortion can in fact be discussed without the
instructor's position preempting the students'. For 
example, if the instructor believes and puts forth the 
argument that anti-abortion laws relegate women to social 
vessels to be manipulated by patriarchal notions of 
"family," the "truth" of the argument, according to the ways 
it is studied, must resist conclusion based on individual 
belief or desire. Its accuracy or primacy depends instead 
on the critical'understanding of who benefits socially and
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economically from that position and the justifications on 
which the argument relies.
To take it a step further, the instructor's position 
may be different from the students' given the difference in
power between the instructor and the students, the
allegiances and duties each attaches to-and fulfills within 
the academy, and the individual cultural and political 
currencies that inform their positions. Although students 
can in any situation potentially mimic the instructor's 
ideology, if their critiques are conducted with a firm 
understanding of social-epistemology, they have little 
choice but to analyze the topic from multiple situations, 
including the instructor's and their own, and come to
somewhat different conclusions based on their uniquely
situated locations. Social-epistemology, if it holds to its
theoretical aims, attempts to complicate any ownership of
"truth," including the instructor's. Hence, Hairston's 
question, "Can't any professor claim the right to 
indoctrinate students simply because he or she is right?" 
(189), becomes moot. "Truth" is established not according to 
a particular ideological position but as an understanding of 
the way the position is constructed and maintained through 
relationships. Ideologies thus become transient and
situated, or, as Berlin states, "imbricated," i.e. layered
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in the particular relational lenses through which they are’
studied.
This understanding complicates Hairston's position that 
"[. . .]■ diversity and ideology will not flourish together
By definition, they're incompatible"(189), which 
seems to be her justification for her claim that "[. . .] we
[instructors] shouldn't even have to mention [. . .
political topics such as] racism and sexism in our society— 
that's a given, as is our commitment to work to overcome it" 
(188). Diversity, by definition, assumes multiple
perspectives on any given position. Multiple perspectives 
assume multiple voices; otherwise, the dialogue is silenced 
before it even begins. Thus, diversity exists fundamentally 
on voiced ideologies, however naturalized those ideologies 
may at first appear. According to Berlin,
Ideology always brings with it strong social and
cultural reinforcement, so that what we take to
exist, to have value, and to be possible seems 
necessary, normal, and inevitable—in the nature of 
things. This goes for power as well, since 
ideology naturalizes certain authority
regimes—those of class, race, and gender, for 
example—and renders alternatives all but
unthinkable. In this way, it determines
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■ who can act and what can be accomplished.
Finally, ideology is minutely inscribed in the 
discourse of daily practice, where it emerges as
pluralistic and conflicted. (Rhetorics . . . 78)
Contrary to Berlin, Hairston's position assumes that 
all people understand inherently what is culturally just and 
unjust and that we all have some kind of built-in locating
device that will naturally ferret out the multiple ways that
societies and individuals produce, reproduce, and extend
cultural injustice. As they apply to the intersection of 
FYC and social-epistemic rhetoric, cultural power structures 
are, like any other power structures, rooted in firm 
convictions and the language that delivers them, both of 
which are difficult to discover, to understand from multiple 
perspectives, and to resist if necessary. Social-epistemic 
rhetoric, as Berlin describes it, accepts this position and 
attempts to complicate the understanding by uncovering the 
relationships in terms of who benefits and in what ways.
Thus, the result of this kind of examination, although
complex and multifaceted, is not, as Hairston suggests, to
establish a hierarchy of ideologies—with the instructor's on 
top—but to critically examine and understand "[. . .] the 
subtle effects of signifying practices as key to egalitarian 
decision making" (79). And because FYC assumes at least
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part of the responsibility for facilitating this kind of 
exploration and critical inquiry at a level appropriate for' 
college and university study, to alienate the instructor 
from this process is in essence to foreground any
justification offered by students, regardless of its
irrationality, as correct. Thus, we renege on our
responsibility as instructors to teach the skills necessary 
for developing critical thinking not only in a post­
secondary educational setting but also in a diverse 
democracy, in which diverse and contentious views are 
constantly in disagreement.
From this perspective, social-epistemology's bias is 
not located in its advocacy of one political or social 
theory over another. In other words a social-epistemic 
study of patriarchy or feminism would not automatically 
place patriarchy as the more oppressive of the two. It 
assumes instead that all social relationships are constantly 
struggling for power, and they therefore benefit some to the 
detriment of others. A., social-epistemic study would in fact
work to-discover who benefits and how those benefits are
socially and politically maintained and signified. Thus, 
Hairston's claims that social-epistemology favors leftist 
ideologies are difficult to justify, especially given the 
shift in power that-Is necessary to facilitate a productive
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study. Yet, the practitioners she invokes to rationalize 
her claims do in fact violate protocol. This very real 
contradiction suggests that something about social-epistemic 
rhetoric or the way in which the theory is read potentially 
leads to an imbalanced treatment of political and social 
topics in FYC. Traditional power dynamics established 
between .students and teachers may, however, contribute to
the dilemma.
As stated earlier, according to social epistemologists, 
language is social and therefore political, and the 
relationships involved in a language exchange, because they 
are ultimately political, are defined by power struggles, 
and those power struggles benefit some and relegate others 
to inferior and oppressed positions in the social structure. 
Because of this, a social-epistemic inquiry into language
will study not only language but the political and social 
influences impinging upon it. Given the nature of this kind 
of inquiry, power in the classroom needs to shift from the 
instructor to the community, because the focus of what 
function language is serving changes. The student should no 
longer be impelled to ask the teacher, "Is this right?" 
Instead, the student and the instructor must ask, "What or
whom does this convention serve? and how?" As a result, "[.
. .] the responses of an audience are never totally
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predictable, never completely in the control of the sender 
of a coded message or of the coded message itself" (83-84). 
This necessarily upsets the perceived authority of the 
instructor and, consequently, the perceived authority of the 
audience, two positions that are imbued with very specific
amounts of social currencies.
Furthermore, even without the lens of social-epistemic
rhetoric guiding the class, as established in the preceding 
chapters, instructors in composition courses studying 
argumentation through political ideologies must work to 
resist conclusions until a full and inclusive study 
justifies them. Instead, what often happens is the adoption 
of what'Linda Brodkey calls a "commonsensical pedagogy":
"The commonsense view of language and composition makes any 
pedagogical practice that exceeds policing student language 
suspicious because it challenges a hierarchy wherein others 
claim the right to discipline student thought" (200) . 
Although I believe the position to be somewhat naive- 
compos it ionists do in fact share the responsibility of 
influencing student language and thought—the ways in which 
we influence language and. thought are critical to 
establishing either a productive or reductive understanding 
of argumentation and language as weil.
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Brodkey makes an important distinction between 
productive and reductive criticism—one that stays in line 
with social-epistemic rhetoric's goals—when she states,
Frankly, I do not much care whether students 
believe the arguments that writers lay out against 
the absolute objectivity of objectivity, but I do 
care whether they give these arguments as well as 
those written from other unfamiliar perspectives a
full hearing. I care for a number of reasons, 
foremost among them that I understand the critique 
of received wisdom to be if not the only at least 
one of the most important purposes of scholarship.
In order to ensure that students at least hear
what those who argue that their vested interests 
are not served by common-sense versions of
objectivity or difference have to say, we have 
privileged what I see as an academically 
responsible version of argumentation over other 
forms of argumentation and other forms of writing.
(emphasis Brodkey 201)
In this ;vein, students are required to listen to,
understand, and incorporate arguments, some of which will be
antithetical to their versions of the "truth" of the
argument, and the responsibility of the instructor is to
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interpolate to what extent those positions have been
evaluated and used to justify the conclusion. The
instructor's authority is then necessarily resituated to 
view and judge the support sustaining the argument instead 
of merely the conclusion the student accepts as true. 
Juxtaposing this understanding with Bauer's class from the 
previous chapter, feminism does not have to be a reductive 
argument. Rather, Bauer focused more on the conclusion—that 
students needed to accept feminist theory as a viable 
alternative to patriarchy—instead of evaluating the 
students' support and the ways in which it led to their 
conclusions. As Berlin states on. the same subject, " [. . .J 
the different forms that patriarchy assumes in different 
social classes make for correspondingly different patterns 
of behavior and consequences for power and privilege"
(Rhetorics 84). As a result, different readings are not
only possible but necessary for a full understanding of the 
topic. In terms of Bauer's class, instead of asking her 
students what led them to reject feminism, she assumed it
was their entrenched and somewhat benighted positions within 
the patriarchy that forced the rejection, which may in .fact 
be true,: but it is her responsibility to complicate the 
position only to the extent that students use that
information accurately within their arguments. If they
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merely reject the information without incorporating it, then 
her reading may be accurate. If they incorporate it, then 
refute it, that argument—at least in theory—is justifiable, 
sound, and the democratic goal of sustained critical inquiry 
is performed in an ethical and educational manner. In 
short, -Bauer's responsibility regarding secondary curricula 
in the FYC classroom’is not to teach students feminism but
to teach ways of critiquing academic, political, and social 
theories, which in her case happen to be studying feminism 
and patriarchy. In this way, the instructors maintain a 
governing authority over the ways arguments are formed and 
supported but subsequently relinquish authority over what is 
correct1and incorrect regarding the topic of inquiry. 
Consequently, social-epistemic rhetoric retains its 
integrity as a constructive way of critiquing a topic 
instead of reducing the argument to binary judgments of what
is correct and incorrect.
I
As often occurs, difficult theories offer a variety of 
interpretations, and those interpretations become even more 
awkward'when enacted in practical situations. Social- 
epistemic rhetoric is certainly no exception, as its 
position is not only complex but also proposes a
restructuring of classroom authority and propels students 
and instructors into the potentially uncomfortable situation
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of critiquing their own allegiances to political and social 
institutions and traditions. As often happens, any critique 
of politics and normative behaviors is dismissed as radical 
and liberal, which is what I believe Hairston's
generalizations imply. Yet, as Berlin explains, this is a 
much more egalitarian way to create an informed society with 
citizens who are not only able to understand but also to 
criticize and act on social and political injustices. As it 
pertains to the specific responsibilities of FYC in
facilitating critical inquiry, social-epistemic rhetoric 
lays the groundwork for students and instructors to explore 
and critique their relationships within a given framework
without forcing them to accept particular ideological 
positions. Although it is possible for demagogues to usurp 
its platform in the name of "truth" and "justice," if 
understood in its scope and function, social-epistemology 
provides a practical and theoretical environment conducive 
to studying and critiquing such claims. The theory, then, 
holds up to criticism but, due to its subject matter—society 
and politics—may offer certain political platforms the 
illusion of safety for espousing their lop-sided political 
convictions. This, danger, however, is inherent in any
J
theory and its application. To ignore the politics of 
language and rhetoric is to assume that both are neutral in
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their functions, a platform inimical to a complex
understanding of either. This, too, is a political stance 
and is no less coercive or reactionary. Rhetoric, as Berlin 
explains, was founded on its political and social functions
in fifth century Athens. Its uses today are no less
political. To understand its influence and service in 
argumentation is therefore no less important to us than it 
was to serving a functional democracy in ancient Greece. To 
disallow students the opportunity and therefore the 
responsibility to act within this arena is to disallow them 
access to their roles in the university and in society, 
roles that they are repeatedly told rely specifically on
their active involvement.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS
The bulk of this thesis maintains that FYC is in fact a
suitable environment for political discussions, as long as 
those discussions are treated fairly and critically, and as
long as instructors make a significant shift from
traditional patterns of authority. As explained earlier, 
composition instructors have a greater amount of authority 
over primary curricula, to the extent that they presumably 
know what conventions are acceptable within the academy and 
why. I would add here that a certain amount of negotiation 
is possible and necessary in this area, as well; however, 
most practitioners agree that, with elements such as grammar 
and format, productive negotiation can only occur after 
certain conventions are understood. Secondary curricula, on
the other hand, must be authorized to a greater extent by
the audience, with ideological positions critiqued by both
students and instructors. In order to do so, as explained 
in detail in chapter two, FYC classrooms need to nourish an 
anti-foundational approach to knowledge. Fundamental to
this position, multiple perspectives on any social or 
political topics must be reviewed for a full and robust
ideological debate.
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The importance, of a vibrant debate over ideologies, 
however,' should not stop with FYC. Perhaps of greater 
magnitude, composition scholars must maintain the same open 
mindedness to political discussions within the discipline. 
As discussed throughout, Hairston's position, although 
politically motivated, offers an important critique that 
composition must incorporate into the discussion. Her 
insistence that composition is being overrun by leftist 
ideologies, although greatly overgeneralized, has some 
merit, as chapter two demonstrates. Thus, composition 
scholars, instead of rejecting the .position outright, need 
to understand what productive contribution her claims might 
offer. Oh the other hand, Hairston's heated charge to 
cleanse composition discourse of all political interests is 
not only naive but near-sighted in its objectives, and 
instead;of supporting an all or nothing position, it must 
incorporate the reality of impinging political forces.
Both, therefore, maintain stalwart positions that miss the 
point of what it means to teach people how to think 
critically within political and social environments. FYC 
and composition scholarship must address political 
influences openly and head-on if either expects to be taken
seriously.
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Foremost in that address is a closer look at the
separation many scholars and practitioners support between 
essay content and forms. In the first chapter, I draw 
similar distinctions between primary and secondary curricula 
in order to demonstrate the change in classroom authority
necessary to diminish the potential for ideological
coercion. To maintain this distinction further, however,
reduces language to a separation of disconnected parts—a 
reduction that, if sustained, promotes the incongruence this 
thesis proposes to help reduce. The desire to condense 
writing into easily codified parts negates the confluence of 
form, function, and content. Although sometimes necessary 
to demystify the myriad complications with which writers and 
instructors struggle, all', writing, even the most personal, 
functions to- convey its content. As attempts to subvert 
hegemonic forms constantly invoke truculent and turbulent 
rebuttal, content is necessarily tied to its patterns of 
delivery, or its forms. Thus, the three—function, form, and
content—entwine inextricably to the point that to exclude
any one fails to address the others.
Historically, however, many composition scholars and
practitioners insist on isolating one to the detriment of 
others. The tired emphasis on delineating modes of 
discourse is one such example that still greatly influences
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students' thoughts about writing. The fact that students 
often query writing through such questions as "What kind of 
paper is this?" shows the myopic lens such distinctions, if 
they are maintained, promote. If we look at the
implications of this question in greater detail, function is 
implied but dissembled within the form; content is all but 
ignored. If students assume they are writing persuasive 
papers (as a kind of essay), most often they are referring 
to proving an argument. Even if students are writing 
propaganda or an assignment that includes a marketing 
scheme, persuasion means first producing an angle, then 
justifying the position (with an argument) that'attempts to 
become structurally, meaningfully, and aesthetically 
accepting to an audience. To continue using modal 
terminology, the "persuasive paper" will also require some 
level of description, and that description may rely on a 
comparative analysis of divergent interests. Although the 
essay requires facility with multiple elements, the question 
the student is asking maintains a distinction that excludes 
the complexity necessary to proficiently handle the writing 
situation. The question, therefore, is not so much what 
kind of:writing writers do but what function(s) the form(s)
and content serve.
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As an old poet once told me, "Writing is a subversive 
act." Writers are always working for audience acceptance by 
attempting to change what the audience thinks. As Berlin 
explains, this interaction is political and necessarily 
influenced by the content of the essay. Yet, as Linda 
Brodkey states,
It is in pedagogy that teachers articulate a nexus 
of language, thought, and reality that is often 
ignored (as not the content of composition) or
deferred (until students have learned the rules)
in the visible curriculum. (193)
To many, the scope of composition only includes a
maintenance of forms. However, this position excludes
writers/ choices—as it separates form from its
functions—while also sustaining the egregious claim that 
writing has nothing to do with what is being written, a 
position I find shamefully inept, especially when our 
students continuously remind us of its limitations.
For almost four years, I have been working with student 
writers in CSUSB's Writing Center. In that time, although I 
have seen many tutors and students come and go, one element 
remains consistent. Students often insist that writing can 
be reduced to right and wrong. Grammatical conventions, 
syntax, argumentative structure, rhetoric, even stylistics,
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according to the way students ask about writing, fit neatly 
into a binary. The binary confirms a relationship that 
leads new writers to conclude that writing functions solely 
to please instructors and that rhetoric and argumentation 
are somehow owned by instructors and professional writers. 
This understanding negates the authority that FYC attempts 
to help students find, because it sustains the illogical
conclusion that what students write will have no "real"
effect on anyone but their instructors and their grades. 
Students' acceptance of such doctrines, I believe, results 
directly from English instructors', like Hairston's,
insistence that students learn conventions without either
explaining or exploring why such conventions exist and how 
they work to affect an audience. Thus, students are left 
with only a partial understanding of the writing
environment, and instructors are left mystified and angry 
over the "laziness" they constantly encounter in students'
texts.
Although by no means the final word, the arguments laid 
out in this treatise suggest possible ways of allowing 
students to experience complex writing situations while 
exercising authority over the content and forms of their 
writing, without jeopardizing the integrity of a complex 
writing experience. Fundamental to that integrity, however,
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is a synthesis of function, form, and content and an
understanding of how writing instructors should establish 
and relinquish authority within those elements. As I tell 
my students every semester, my goal is their independence, 
but their independence is determined by their understanding 
of their responsibilities as writers with an audience. 
Students often resist, but through their resistence, they 
find, realistically, what works and what does not, based on 
very real and visible responses from their audience. And 
that response is only possible when I make my position 
visible and tie my comments to the content of their essays. 
For example, when I make a claim that a student's rhetoric 
sounds accusatory and may work to shut down the acceptance 
of the point, or if I claim that the counter-argument is 
necessary and obvious for supporting a particular position,
I also make the claim public and attempt to achieve
consensus. And I should note here that sometimes the class
sees the situation differently, and I am forced to
renegotiate my position openly, providing the same support 
that I expect students to offer.
This is not to say that I or any instructor should 
relinquish total control over a class. Reflecting 
accurately, at least according to the students who voice 
their opinions about my classes, I establish authority based
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on the support I offer for my claims, just as I expect 
students to do with theirs. My credibility as an instructor 
therefore depends on my lived experience as a writer and the 
extent to which I can create realistic writing experiences 
for students. The most notable contribution, as per 
students' comments, is when I "open their eyes to the 
complexity of the world around them." This comment reflects 
not only the theoretical implications that this thesis lays 
out but more importantly that the theory is made visible in 
practice, as it inextricably links content, form, and 
function. In short, what students say becomes entwined with 
how they say it; both are dependent on what functions their 
writing serve and how those functions are interpreted by a 
very real audience. And after some time in this
environment, students often begin to preface their writing 
questions with an explanation of why they made a certain 
move in their essays. Unlike the questions at the beginning 
of this chapter, the preface along with the question implies
authority and reasoning and suggests that students are 
beginning to see their choices in response to others. At 
that point, I smile and instead of giving them a rule to 
follow, I ask them instead why they are concerned about the 
move they made. Most often they know the implications, so I
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tell them to leave it only if they are comfortable with the 
consequences of the particular move or statement.
More to the point, however, if the students' questions 
are ideological, and if the students persist in asking if 
the ideologies are "right or wrong," the only answer I feel 
justified offering is in the form of a question, "What do. 
you think so and so (whomever we are reading at the time) 
would say in response to your claim?" This question is 
possible only if the class is situated between complex, 
diverse, and competing ideological platforms. To situate 
Hairston's Malawi student in this arena, similar questions 
can only be handled stylistically and grammatically; the 
content, however, cannot be challenged, as the audience 
remains ignorant to the larger political or social context. 
Although Hairston's exercise can potentially work to teach 
narrative pacing or vivid description, it fails in its 
attempts to make writing "necessary" in a larger context,
because the audience is only able to enter the conversation 
on the level of form. Content and function become vague and
fictionalized, as the separation of writing elements is
maintained.
This is not to say that students' personal experiences 
are unimportant. I would argue that they are fundamental 
but only in relation to others, especially given students'
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insistence on overgeneralizing the importance of personal 
experience. As discussed in chapter two, students often see 
personal exceptions in any theory; the logical move then is 
to assume that personal experience is key to reconciling 
issues of debate. Although logical to an extent, the move 
evades complexity and excludes audience and purpose. 
Students' task in any genre of writing is at the very least 
to negotiate a confluence of perspectives or voices. Even 
the most personal writing hinges on conflict and thereby 
establishes a relationship of competing interests. As I 
established previously, students need to negotiate their own 
position in regards to these other interests, then include 
them to the degree that they influence the position, then 
restructure the position based on that synthesis. This 
pattern should not seem foreign to anyone in the writing 
profession, as it mirrors 19th century German philosopher 
Georg Hegel's dialectic pattern of thesis, antithesis, and 
synthesis. Yet, as soon as the interaction is described as 
"political," writing scholars and practitioners often hedge, 
calling the position, as Hairston does, "leftist" and 
reacting by subtracting the meaning of writing from its 
forms, while consequently promoting the near-sighted and 
limited view of academic writing as a perfunctory exercise 
of memorizing forms.
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Although imbued with social and political tension, 
composition studies must not allow its position to influence 
its function to the degree that it excludes what it is asked 
to accomplish. As is, its anti-foundational position 
situates it perfectly for the kind of robust debate
necessary to offer students a holistic view of language and 
the topics conveyed by its use. This position must be 
maintained if instructors are to facilitate the practices 
necessary to allow students access to an active 
participation in their post-secondary education. Basic- 
skills instruction, expressivism, depoliticizing the 
classroom, or a separation of any elements that influence 
writing not only lead to a limited view of the writing 
experience but disallow students the chance to engage 
writing in realistic, complex, and diverse situations. Any 
one of these, as I have emphasized throughout this essay, 
also reduces ideologies to entrenched "political" positions 
without the critical facility necessary to sustain or debunk
them.
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